Introduction
For most of its history the U.S. electricity sector predominantly consisted of large, vertically integrated and heavily regulated utilities. By the late 1990s, however, a transformed industry took shape, characterized by substantial de-integration, a more competitive generation sector, and a greater market orientation to remaining regulation. These changes have required the development of several novel approaches and institutions to address unique features of electricity markets. Unlike most goods, electricity cannot be efficiently stored, and thus production must be constantly matched with final demand in order to avoid disruptions and possible blackouts. Within a vertically integrated firm, this coordination is achieved by common ownership and control of generating units and distribution systems. A system operator takes various system constraints into account and administratively ensures electrical balance at all times.
Whatever the merits of deintegration of generation for purposes of fostering competition in that market, deintegration creates the need for some alternative method of performing the coordination functions that were previously internal to the firm. All restructured electricity markets have had to develop some method of coordination. In the U.S. that method has been regional transmission organizations, or RTOs. RTOs are independent non-profit corporations that have functional control of transmission assets in a region, assets that are, however, owned by other entities, namely, the operating utilities that distribute electricity to end users. Most fundamentally, RTOs are intended to ensure equal access to the transmission network as they centrally dispatch electricity over member utilities' transmission systems. RTOs also organize competitive wholesale markets, coordinate the complex operating decisions of member utilities, monitor wholesale market performance, and coordinate long term investment planning. RTOs now cover well over one-half of customers and sales of electricity in the U.S. 1 As they have expanded in geographic coverage and functional scope, controversies have arisen about their rapidly growing costs as well as their effectiveness in preventing congestion and in planning investment. This paper examines the first of these issues, namely, RTO costs. We exploit the fact that existing RTOs have come into being and initiated specific functions at different times. We relate those functions and their timing to differences in their costs over time in order to cast light on several questions:
First, we investigate the costs of each of the market functions administered by RTOsday-ahead markets, financial transmission rights, and so forth. This will help in understanding which functions are most costly and thereby cast light on the relative cost of RTO functions.
Second, we investigate the relative costliness of individual RTOs in performing the same functions, in order to determine which represents the best (and worst)-practice RTO.
Third, we examine whether RTOs in operation for longer periods realize cost savings over time and also whether later-forming RTOs are less costly relative to early RTOs. Both of these effects represent types of learning economies.
Finally, we document economies of scale over the sampled range of RTO -output.‖ Not surprisingly, we find evidence that administering markets for energy, ancillary services, and financial transmission rights all increase RTO costs; however, we are unable to precisely estimate the contribution of each. In terms of differences in efficiency across RTOs, we find some evidence that ERCOT is the least costly. Finally, while we fail to find evidence of economies of learning, either within or across RTOs, we do document economies of scale.
1 According to the ISO/RTO Council (IRC), an industry organization consisting of representatives of North American ISO/RTOs, RTOs serve more than 50 percent of Canada's population as well. See, http://www.isorto.org/.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The next section provides some background on wholesale electric power markets and the origin of RTOs. Section 3 further describes the evolution of existing RTOs and their various specific functions. Section 4 sets out the econometric model, hypotheses to be tested, and the data. Section 5 presents the results of our analysis and 6 concludes.
Background on regional transmission organizations
This section provides some history of RTOs, a description of their basic functions, and a discussion of controversy that has arisen regarding their costs.
History
For most of its history the U.S. electricity sector has been dominated by vertically integrated and heavily regulated utilities that bundled and sold generation, transmission, and distribution services. States were responsible for regulating retail electricity rates, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, formerly the Federal Power Commission) was responsible for the rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale transactions and interstate transmission. Beginning in 1978, however, reforms made inroads on this traditional structure, and under the direction of Congress, FERC began creating opportunities for utilities and independent power producers to trade power at market based rates.
2 Some regions, particularly the Northeast, transformed their transmission systems from a set of balkanized utilities to 2 The initial reforms of the industry spawned from the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT 1992) . Under these congressional directives, FERC developed opportunities for nonutility power producers and generation dependent utilities to sell and purchase wholesale power at market-based rates. coordinated power pools aimed at facilitating wholesale transactions over larger geographic areas. Some of these power pools would eventually form RTOs.
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Initial efforts to foster wholesale competition were compromised by a transmission network optimized for vertically integrated utilities but also still largely owned by integrated utilities that were foreclosing access to their sections of the transmission network. Nonutility power producers and generation-dependent distribution utilities relied on the transmission wires owned by vertically integrated firms; thus, wholesale competition could not flourish without equal access to the grid. In 1996 FERC issued Order 888 requiring utilities to -functionally unbundle,‖ that is, to state separate rates for wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services, as well as to take transmission service under the same tariff as it provided its transmission customers. 4 While functional unbundling established a commitment to equal access, it was insufficient to overcome the inherent advantages of common ownership of transmission and distribution assets by most utilities. Accordingly, in December 1999 FERC issued Order 2000 with the goal that all transmission owners would place their transmission facilities under the control of an RTO.
5 FERC set minimum characteristics and functions for RTOs, namely, (1) independence from market participants, (2) possession of operational authority for all transmission facilities under the RTO's control, and (3) exclusive authority to maintain short-term reliability. FERC argued that these institutions would bring about increased efficiency through regional transmission pricing; improved congestion management and grid reliability; more efficient planning for transmission and generation investments; more accurate estimates of available network capacity; and more effective management of physical flows of electricity.
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The seven existing RTOs are listed in Table 1 
Functions of RTOs
RTOs are most unusual economic institutions. They are not-for-profit corporations that assume control and management of the bulk power systems of their member utilities, while the latter continue to own all of those assets. There are few entities with comparable ownership and control arrangements. RTOs are self-governed companies directed by a board that is independent from market participants but in many cases intended to reflect all stakeholders.
RTOs raise capital and receive revenues for transmission services they provide. RTOs do not own transmission facilities, nor are they responsible for the maintenance and repair, or fixed investment costs, of the transmission facilities over which they direct the flow of power. Their essential role is as independent service provider that administers the terms and conditions of transmission services and maintains the short-term reliability of the network. As such, the organization is designed to ensure non-discriminatory access and operate the grid in a manner consistent with engineering efficiency and market competition.
RTOs perform a number of specific functions, each of which gives rise to added costs that will be examined below. Their descriptions are as follows:
Energy markets
RTOs create and operate decentralized trading markets for electrical energy. The most basic approach involves a real-time energy market that resolves discrepancies between real-time demand from load-serving entities and supply from producers. We will refer to this approach as the single-settlement energy market. This type of energy market has been employed largely by ERCOT, CAISO, and SPP 8 . Other RTOs, including ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, and MISO, have implemented two-settlement energy markets, where the RTO also operates a day-ahead forward market. The latter are intended to facilitate reliability and efficiency by allowing the RTO to secure adequate supplies to meet forecasted demand ahead of real-time, and to provide buyers and sellers the opportunity to hedge real-time price volatility.
Ancillary service markets
Since electricity cannot be effectively stored, system operators keep an inventory of generators available to call on when system conditions change. Examples of so-called ancillary services include spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, reactive power, and regulation, each of which represents somewhat different degrees of contingent-available supply to the RTO.
Ancillary services can be procured by the RTO via cost based payments, or less frequently, the RTO may organize a market where generators bid for the right to supply. For our purposes all of these variations will be considered as a single -ancillary services‖ market function.
Transmission Rights
To address possible network congestion, RTOs must have a system for allocating network capacity and keeping the system within its security limits. Some RTOs, including the Northeastern RTOs and MISO, employ -nodal pricing‖ in which participants submit bids to buy or sell electricity at specific network locations or -nodes,‖ whereas other RTOs use a broader -zonal‖ pricing system. In addition, the nodal markets all use a so called security-constrained economic dispatch-a network-wide optimization process designed to choose the lowest-cost bids to balance electricity supply and demand subject to the physical constraints of the system's generation and transmission facilities. All of these systems create price uncertainty, and so
RTOs have created various forms of transmission rights to permit market participants to hedge the resulting uncertainty. Typically, the RTO organizes monthly and yearly auctions for transmission rights of various forms.
Resource adequacy and capacity markets
Although settlement markets were originally believed sufficient to guide market participants with respect to capacity investment, in practice this has not occurred. As a result
RTOs have devised various supplementary incentives to foster investment. The Northeastern
RTOs have all implemented markets for capacity in which demand side participants are required to procure a sufficient portfolio of generating capacity to meet a resource adequacy requirement.
The RTO conducts auctions that can be used by participants that have not met these requirements with bilateral contracts. CAISO has also implemented a resource adequacy program; however it continues to evaluate whether a capacity market will be beneficial. Our empirical analysis seeks to determine the costs associated with capacity markets, but as we shall see the data make this part of the inquiry less satisfactory.
Issues in RTO markets.
In its original rulemaking on RTOs, FERC asserted that RTOs would be a cost effective method of achieving their important purposes. FERC staff estimated formation of RTOs would result in cost savings of $2.4 billion annually. Using updated cost data, she shows even optimistic projected benefits are outweighed by increasing RTO costs, concluding that FERC appears to be a -true-believer‖ in competitive markets and its RTO policy is not -based on a comprehensive analysis of the possible costs, benefits and risks.‖ Some private studies reinforced these concerns. Tracking past RTO costs and using proposed budgets, Lutzenhiser (2004) calculated that RTO expenditures would total approximately $1 billion. Extrapolating to the entire national electricity market, she estimated national RTO expenditures would be $2.4 billion, which was precisely FERC's own -best estimate‖ of the potential annual benefits of national RTO formation, excluding any development costs or indirect costs borne by market participants. Two consultancies, Christensen Associates (2007) and GDS Associates (2007) , have also documented the significant operating expenditures of RTOs, noting that costs, in dollars per megawatt terms, vary widely across RTOs. 14 More critically, it found that FERC officials, industry participants, and experts disagreed on whether RTOs have brought benefits to their regions.
Prominent concerns include swelling costs, a second-best governance structure, and an apparent inability of RTO run wholesale markets to stimulate adequate investment in transmission and generation capacity.
Two other concerns about RTOs deserve mention, although they are not part of our study.
First, RTO governance has come under scrutiny. The RTO structure-a nonprofit that operates 13 GDS predicts that as -RTOs expand their services and as their systems age and must be replaced, the administrative and operational costs will increase.‖ 14 See, Drom (2007) .
assets they do not own-represents a compromise in the restructuring process, due to the existing balkanized transmission system. As Joskow (2005a) describes, Order 2000 effectively takes the existing ownership structure as a constraint and promotes the creation of new not-for-profit independent system operators (ISO, RTO, ITP, pick your favorite name) to deal with these issues. However, these independent entities own no transmission assets, have no linemen or helicopters to maintain transmission lines and respond to outages, and are not directly responsible for the costs of operating, investing in, or the ultimate performance of the transmission networks they ‗manage.'
Ownership, maintenance, and investment decisions remain compartmentalized within individual utilities, while day-to-day system operations are managed by a central independent party. This bifurcation of transmission governance presents challenges for regulators, as well as complicating investment decisions for firms.
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Further, and perhaps most fundamentally, many observers feel that RTOs have simply failed to perform their intended functions well, at whatever cost. 16 Critics point to the increase in congestion, the lack of investment, and the overall performance of RTO-organized markets.
There is broad consensus that transmission investment is failing to keep pace with growing demand for electricity, partially due to a failure in RTO regions to effectively develop a framework for regulating and allocating the cost of transmission investment. These criticisms have grown over time, bringing RTO expansion to a halt as policymakers search for an alternative model for performing the necessary functions.
Bearing these further controversies in mind, we now return to the issue of RTO costs. Once the RTO implements a set of market functions, we assume it minimizes cost subject to its production technology and the price of inputs. Additional market functions are hypothesized to increase costs as the RTO must acquire more capital and labor, while experience may reduce costs through economies of learning. The augmented Cobb Douglass cost function can be written:
Empirical model
(1) 17 We have experimented with more than one measure of output in the model. Unfortunately-likely due to already limited degrees of freedom-none of the other measures have yielded satisfactory results.
where the price of capital and labor are denoted by, and , respectively. Finally, we may write the empirical cost function as:
( 2) represents time-invariant effects specific to each RTO, is a term for yearly industry-wide effects, and represents an idiosyncratic error. 18 The may include unobserved or difficult to quantify differences across RTOs, including differences in market monitoring, planning and expansion, and interregional coordination procedures. However, to the extent that unobserved cost causative functions are insignificant, our estimates of , the RTO fixed effects, identify time-invariant differences in efficiency.
The temporal shocks, , include national changes in RTO policy and the price of capital. 19 We are particularly concerned about the effect of FERC rulemakings and policy statements that may alter RTO behavior or production technology. 19 The price of capital may fluctuate with the interest rate, investor perceptions of the risk of financing an RTO, as well as changes in the price of underlying capital goods (primarily software).
effects will be correlated with the fixed effect terms of later forming RTOs, and omission of will tend to impart a positive bias on the fixed effects of later forming RTOs.
One of our primary goals is to estimate the incremental impact of market functions on RTO costs. This will be captured by , the coefficient vector on . Given the diverse groupings and implementation timelines of the various market functions across RTOs, we have sufficient variation in these dummy variables to identify the relative costs of each market function. With the RTO and yearly fixed effects, with-in RTO variation in costs identifies the marginal effects of each market function. In other words, captures the difference-indifferences: the marginal effect of a particular market function on costs, after controlling for RTO-specific differences in costs ( ) and industry-wide changes in costs ( ).
We also investigate economies of learning, that is, reductions in costs due to experience with the production process. 20 The coefficient vector captures the marginal effect of experience. We measure internal experience with a variable that counts the number of years of operation by an RTO, its age. Our measure of external experience is the total number of years of operation across all RTOS. That is, the sum of all RTOs' ages in a particular year. The coefficient on this variable is intended to capture the impact of industry-wide learning.
Finally, we note that the model estimates parameters of the Cobb Douglass production technology. The estimated elasticity of cost with respect to the wage is captured by , and returns to scale can be measured as , the reciprocal of the elasticity of total costs with respect to output. As one can see, the price of capital has been excluded from the empirical model. Unfortunately, the majority of an RTO's capital investments are in the development of proprietary software systems used to operate wholesale markets. As a result, we were unable to construct a relevant variable for the price of capital.
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We should also note possible concerns about endogeneity of RTO formation and its effect on our empirical results. Casual inspection of trade publications and FERC rulemakings indicates each RTO's initial market design arose from negotiations among stakeholders, the region's historical industry structure, and possibly some attention to performance. 22 For example, the RTOs in the Northeast share a common design that many observers attribute to a history of power pooling among utilities. Nevertheless, we believe that changes in market design throughout our sample period have been largely the product of FERC rulemaking and other mandates exogenous to any particular RTO, rather than the operating efficiency of the RTOs themselves.
Data and econometric issues
Our analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of annual data for the RTOs operating within the United States from 1998 to 2008. All but ERCOT, which operates solely within the borders of Texas, are subject to FERC jurisdiction and must submit annual financial statistics via the Form 1 electric utility annual report. These Form 1 data serve as our primary source for 21 Using the generic property that a cost function is linearly homogenous in factor prices, the implied elasticity of total costs with respect to the price of capital is . 22 Paul Joskow (2005b) articulates a frequently echoed sentiment describing the process leading to California's initial market design as, -contentious and highly politicized, reflecting perceptions by various interest groups about how different wholesale market institutions would advance or constrain their interests and, in my view, an inadequate amount of humility regarding uncertainties about the performance attributes of different institutional arrangements. The discussion of alternative institutions was polluted by an unfortunate overtone of ideological rhetoric that attempted to characterize the debate about wholesale market institutions as one between ‗central planners' and ‗free market' advocates.‖ annual operating expenses. Data for ERCOT and for Southwest Power Pool (prior to being officially recognized by FERC in 2004) were collected from publicly available annual reports. 23 The variable OPEXP represents the natural log of the standard annual accounting measure -total operating expenses‖ including operation expenses, maintenance expenses, and depreciation expenses. LOAD measures output, the log of annual net energy for load (GWh).
The relevant data were compiled from RTO and FERC sources. Our series for the log of wage, WAGE, was constructed from Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the average annual pay of workers in the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution sector (NAICS 2211) of the state where the RTO's headquarters is located. Both wage and operating expense data are deflated to year-2005 dollars with the GDP deflator.
The dummy variables that describe the grouping of markets operated by RTO i in year t were constructed based on information from RTO websites, particularly the -state of the markets‖ reports prepared by each RTO's independent market monitor. The dummy variables assume a value of unity in any year in which the RTO implemented the specified market function(s) prior to the fourth quarter.
24 Table 2 describes the implementation timeline of market functions for each RTO. With the information in Table 2 in mind, we can explain how the market function dummies are defined. The first variable, REALTIME, indicates operation of a real-time energy market. The second variable, DAYAHEAD_FTR, equals one if RTO i operated a day ahead market with financial transmission rights in year t. We have combined the indicator 23 We also experimented with inclusion of data from the RTOs operating in Canada. Unfortunately we found these institutions were likely described by meaningfully different production technologies, potentially due their composition of fewer transmission owners or different geography of their bulk transmission grids.
24 PJM implemented a regulation market in June of 2000 and a market for reserves in December of 2002. As a compromise, we set the ANCILL equal to one for all years after 2000 in PJM.
variables for day-ahead energy and financial transmission rights because these market functions were simultaneously implemented by ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, and PJM (implemented in the same 11 month period by PJM). DAYAHEAD_FTR, combined with REALTIME, represents the two-settlement energy markets with nodal pricing employed in the Northeast and Midwest.
Because CAISO and ERCOT-the two RTOs that utilized a zonal market structure-did not simultaneously implement financial transmission rights with their energy markets, we are able to identify the impact of zonal financial transmission rights on RTO costs with the dummy variable ZONAL_FTR. Finally, ANCILL and CAPACITY, indicate operation of ancillary service and capacity market functions.
We recognize the use of a binary variable may well exaggerate how discrete the policy change actually is. Certainly, RTOs perform research and testing prior to market implementation, and cost effects may be greater in the first year of implementation. We view our current approach as a first approximation to be refined based on further information and testing.
Because of the limited size of our dataset, we face a delicate trade-off between accuracy and precision. Failing to control for the RTO-specific and year-specific components of the error leaves our estimates subject to omitted variables bias. However, due to the limited sample size and high correlation among many independent variables, including a full set of RTO and yearly fixed effects limits the efficiency of our estimates. Accordingly, to offer some initial descriptive results, we begin with several parsimonious specifications that do not fully account for unobservable factors. Then we sequentially add controls to more accurately identify the impact of market functions on costs, albeit at the cost of precision reflected in the standard errors.
Finally, we augment the model to test for learning economies. This approach allows us to develop a set of results from which we can address potential sources of bias, and appropriately temper our conclusions given the limitations of the dataset.
To correct for group-wise heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation, we fit all specifications using a feasible GLS estimator. The estimated variance matrix is constructed from the residuals of an OLS regression, and allows for a unique variance and autocorrelation parameter in each panel.
Results and Discussion
This section begins with an overview of the results. We also outline our approach of sequentially adding additional controls. In subsections 5.2 -5.5 we respectively discuss in more detail the cost effects of RTO market functions, the relative efficiency of particular RTOs, economies of learning, and economies of scale.
Overview of Results
The first column of table 5 presents the estimates of a model that does not control for industry-wide time-varying effects. While a causal interpretation of this model requires the assumption that is orthogonal to the included regressors-a very strong and likely unrealistic assumption-this model is included as a descriptive baseline. In column 2, a linear trend variable is added to capture time-varying unobserved factors. These estimates are more reasonable in terms of the magnitude and sign of the coefficients on the market function variables and WAGE. Even so, while the linear trend variable is quite intuitive, it is a very restrictive way to capture time-varying omitted factors. 25 Accordingly, column 3 presents the fully specified model with RTO and yearly fixed effects. With this specification, the model indicates that all functions, except administering a capacity market, add to costs.
The models presented in columns 4 through 6 explore economies of learning and scale.
By adding the variable LNYRSOP, the first specification examines economies of internal learning, that is, efficiency gains associated with an RTO's own experience. Specification 5 adds LNYRSOPTOTAL to test for external learning arising from total industry experience. The parameter estimates of both models are not consistent with learning economies. In the final column, PJM and MISO have been excluded because of their geographic expansions over the sampled time period. When PJM and MISO are excluded, the coefficient on LOAD has a more obvious interpretation; that is, the elasticity of total cost with respect to load growth over a fixed network. That the coefficient on LOAD increases, suggests that some of the -economies of scale‖ observed with a full sample arise from geographic expansion.
Market Functions
We interpret the estimated cost effect of individual market functions with some caution, due to the aforementioned limitations of the market function dummies and small data set.
Scanning across the models presented in table 5, one can see the parameter estimates are sensitive to the model specification. Nonetheless, in the most comprehensive specification presented in column 5, the estimated coefficients on all of the market function dummies absent CACPACITY have the expected sign and pass a one-sided test of statistical significance at the ten percent level (there is no hypothesis that market functions reduce cost).
The negative estimated coefficients on CAPACITY in the first two columns of table 5 are likely a result of omitted variables bias. Nonetheless, the non-effect estimated in the full model, is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation is that capacity markets have a trivial impact on costs, particularly compared to markets for energy or ancillary services. Even so, limitations of the data should be noted. Capacity markets have only been implemented by the Northeastern RTOs, and CAPACITY is highly correlated with other market function dummies.
One interesting policy implication from our results is that it appears the single settlement zonal energy markets used in Texas and California during the sampled time period, are more costly than the bi-settlement nodal markets employed in the Northeast and Midwest, all else equal. Specifications 4 and 5 estimate that implementation of a two-settlement energy market with nodal prices increases costs by twenty-one percent over a single real-time energy market, while the zonal market approach increases costs by forty-six percent. Interestingly, CAISO implemented a two-settlement nodal energy market on April 1, 2009 and ERCOT continues to have ongoing plans to convert their current zonal system to a two settlement nodal design.
RTO Effects
As discussed in section 4, the dummy variables used to control for time-invariant RTO effects can help shed light on the relative efficiency of each RTO. One of the factorspotentially the most important one-subsumed in the RTO fixed effects is efficiency, or ability to minimize costs. 26 To the extent that other RTO-specific unobserved factors are inconsequential, the coefficients on the RTO dummies identify the relative costliness of each RTO.
In the first column of table 5 we find that MISO and SPP appear to be most costly, while the other RTOs are all comparable. However, this specification fails to control for industry-wide changes in costs over time. MISO and SPP were the last two organizations to form. As discussed in section 3, if the model does not control for year-specific cost shocks, and they tend to be increasing, the fixed effects terms of the later forming RTOs will tend to be positively biased. The models that control for time-varying unobserved factors, either with a trend variable or yearly dummies, indicate that all RTOs other than ERCOT have statistically equivalent costs, all else equal. While not a testable conjecture-at least within the scope of this paper-it may be the case that ERCOT's independence from FERC, and the fact that it interacts with a sole state regulator, has conferred a cost advantage over other RTOs.
5.4.

Learning economies
One of our priors is that costs might fall as RTOs gain experience. This is not confirmed.
The coefficient on LNYRSOP is positive with a two-sided p-value of 0.054. This indicates that even after controlling for industry wide temporal changes, RTOs become less efficient as they age. One potential explanation is that growing bureaucracy among competing stakeholders adds to costs over time. 27 In column 5, LNYRSOPTOTAL is added to explore external learning, increased efficiency associated with overall industry experience. Here we find a null effect.
While the estimated coefficient on LNYRSOPTOTAL is negative, the standard error is roughly three times the magnitude. Taken together, these models provide no evidence of learning, either within or across RTOs.
Economies of "scale"
In the first five models presented in table 5, the estimated coefficients on LOAD range from 0.39 to 0.53. All of these estimates provide evidence of increasing returns to scale, as a value of one falls well outside the parameter's ninety-five percent confidence interval in each case. A value of 0.5, which does fall within each of the confidence intervals, implies a production function that is homogenous of degree two. That is, a one hundred percent increase in output is associated with a fifty percent increase in costs.
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While increasing returns to scale is not surprising, returns of this magnitude are. It is important to recognize-due to our imperfect measure of RTO scale-the coefficient on LOAD arises from two types of variation. PJM and MISO both expanded their geographic footprint during the sample period. Alternatively, the other RTOs experienced growth in output attributed principally to increased demand over a fixed network. When PJM and MISO are excluded from the sample, the estimated elasticity of total costs with respect to output is 0.97, implying constant returns to scale. Thus, the geographic expansion that occurred in PJM and MISO appears to have contributed to the -economies of scale‖ documented in the other regressions.
It should be noted, if the former is in fact the case, internal learning may in fact occur, however, it remains unidentified by our model. 28 Our model implies returns to scale are not a function of output. We experimented with models that included a squared term for output; however, the coefficient estimates were unpredictable and erratic. Visual inspection of the residuals (from the models presented) plotted against output, does not indicate a missing variable.
We have attempted to employ other measures of RTO scale, such as miles of transmission wire and the number of transmission-owning members; however, the results have been less than satisfactory. Heterogeneity in the way data are collected across RTOs and the limited number of observations in our data set, both limit our ability to better capture RTO size.
Nonetheless, future research should certainly aim to further hash out differences in the economies arising from load growth on a fixed network, from those arising due to geographic expansion. Political realities and limitations of the existing transmission infrastructure aside, our results provide an additional theoretical argument in favor of larger RTO footprints.
Conclusion
Regional transmission organizations are critically important to the restructured electric power sector, but they have drawn increasing scrutiny of their costs, governance, and performance. That scrutiny has not been accompanied by much in the way of systematic evidence or analysis of their performance. This paper has developed a framework for analysis of RTO costs and has sought to cast light on the major questions raised about their cost experience.
Despite some limitations of the data, our analysis comes to several conclusions.
Least surprisingly-despite our inability to recover precise point estimates of the cost of each function-we find that RTO costs are directly related to the number of market functions performed. More specifically, all specifications, including models with RTO and yearly fixed effects, establish that market functions for real-time energy, congestion management (either zonal or nodal transmission rights), and ancillary services each increase costs. In sum, we find convincing evidence that moving beyond their fundamental role as open-access transmission service provider causes RTOs to register notable added costs. Using the parameter estimates from specification 4, we have simulated the estimated total costs of several hypothetical RTOs.
The results, presented in table 6, offer a convenient summary of the estimated cost effects of various market functions.
We find no evidence of learning economies, either of an industry-wide or RTO-specific nature. Upon examining economies of scale, we acknowledge that net energy transmitted to load is an imperfect measure of RTO size; however, estimates reveal substantial economies of scale.
Analysis that excludes PJM and MISO, which both added transmission owning members, suggests that much of the economies may arise from geographic expansion versus load growth over a fixed network.
Finally, examination of efficiency across RTOs reveals that ERCOT is the only RTO to achieve a different (lower) level of expenditure than PJM, the baseline RTO, after employing a full set of controls. While purely conjecture, one natural interpretation of this result is that ERCOT's less fractured regulatory structure has conferred a cost advantage. 
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